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S u m m a r y
Nearly 12 million unauthorized immigrants live in the United States. California is home to about 2.7 million of these immigrants, who make up almost 10 percent of the state’s labor force.1 Currently, legislators in Washington, D.C., are considering a comprehensive 
reform of federal immigration policies that could include the legalization of unauthorized 
immigrants. Many observers believe that a legalization program could have a significant eco-
nomic impact. 
Our research suggests otherwise. This report finds that legalizing most currently unau-
thorized immigrants would not lead to dramatic changes in the labor market, either for 
unauthorized immigrants or for native workers. We also find little evidence to support the 
view that such a step would have significant effects on the broader economy, particularly on 
tax revenues or public assistance programs. 
Specifically, we find that legalization is not likely to increase the occupational mobility 
or wages of most unauthorized immigrants, at least in the short run. This is especially true 
for low-skill workers, for whom any improvement is likely to be small at best. For immigrants 
who cross the border without documentation, employment outcomes do improve over time, 
but none of this progress is attributable to gaining legal status. 
For those who gain legal status after overstaying a temporary visa, the outlook is slightly 
better. In these cases, we do see some upward occupational mobility that may be related to 
acquiring legal status. However, this mobility is specifically attributable to skill level: Highly 
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skilled immigrants, regardless of how they arrived in the United States, exhibit occupational 
improvements after gaining legal status. 
What does this mean for the larger labor market? Given that the labor market returns 
associated with legalization are small, at least in the short term, we argue that a legalization 
program is not likely to significantly affect the employment outcomes of native workers. In 
particular, the lack of upward occupational mobility among low-skill unauthorized workers 
suggests that legalization will not lead to much, if any, increase in labor market competition 
with low-skill natives.
We consider legalization’s effects on the broader economy in light of likely changes in tax 
revenues and the expenditures of public assistance programs. We find that the vast majority 
of unauthorized immigrants report filing federal tax returns before acquiring legal status. 
Therefore, we expect any increase in tax revenues—deriving from either increased filing 
rates or improved wages—to be small. 
In addition, we expect that there would be little short-term change in the expenditures 
of public assistance programs. The eligibility rules for most of these programs would prob-
ably prohibit an increase in their use, at least in the short run, by even the poorest of newly 
legalized immigrants. 
Nonetheless, California should be prepared for any future legalization program. After the 
legalization of nearly 3 million unauthorized immigrants in 1986, individual states received 
federal impact grants to help offset the state’s costs associated with the newly legalized 
immigrants. If English-language proficiency becomes a requirement in a new legalization 
program, the costs of providing classes could be significant. We suggest that California lobby 
vigorously for any future impact grants to offset any related expenditures.
 Please visit the report’s publication page
http://www.ppic.org/main/publication.asp?i=869
to find related resources.
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Introduction
Recent estimates suggest that the United States is home  
to approximately 12 million unauthorized immigrants,  
2.7 million of whom reside in California (Passel and  
Cohn, 2009). The general public is deeply—and often 
vociferously—concerned about the effects these immi-
grants may have on the economy and, in particular, on 
labor markets and public assistance programs. Policy-
makers continue to face difficult decisions about whether 
and how to legalize some of these immigrants, and to 
weigh the costs and benefits of doing so.
An important factor for policymakers’ consideration 
is the effect of legalization on employment outcomes. The 
last major overhaul of immigration law, the Immigration 
Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986, included a num-
ber of approaches similar to those under consideration 
today. IRCA legalized nearly 3 million immigrants, but 
it also imposed sanctions for employers who knowingly 
hired immigrants who were not authorized to work. Studies 
that followed the immigrants legalized under IRCA found 
that their occupational prospects and wages improved by 
the early 1990s, approximately four years after gaining 
legal status. A new legalization program could reshape the 
occupational prospects for millions of unauthorized immi-
grants and, perhaps, for native workers as well. It could also 
involve a number of consequences for the general economy.
In this report, we seek to determine whether the 
experiences of the IRCA legalization would be predictive 
of a new legalization program today. We use data from a 
more recent era (2003–2004) and examine outcomes for 
all formerly unauthorized immigrants, not just those from 
Mexico and Central America. We analyze how acquir-
ing Legal Permanent Residence (LPR) status (commonly 
referred to as a “green card”) affects the employment 
outcomes of individuals who previously worked illegally 
in the United States. Using data from the New Immigrant 
Survey (NIS), a representative sample of new LPRs from 
2003, we examine the employment outcomes of immi-
grants who resided and worked in the United States before 
acquiring LPR status. We also examine whether outcomes 
differ between workers who crossed the border illegally 
(“crossers”) and workers who overstayed a temporary visa 
or violated employment restrictions (“overstayers”), by 
comparing their outcomes to those of immigrant workers 
who were never unauthorized before acquiring LPR status 
(“continuously legal”).
Finally, we consider the wider economic impact of legal-
ization, including its effects on the jobs and wages of native 
workers. We consider the possibility of increased tax revenue 
as well as potential increases in the use and cost of public 
assistance. Any legislation would certainly address eligibility 
Policymakers continue to face difficult decisions 
about whether and how to legalize  
some of these immigrants, and to weigh the 
costs and benefits of doing so. 
A note on terminology 
In this report, we refer to immigrants in the United States 
without proper documentation as “unauthorized” immigrants. 
Why use this term rather than “undocumented” or “illegal” 
immigrants? 
 First, for precision. Many immigrants live and work in the 
United States without proper legal authority. However, many 
of these immigrants do have documents. For instance, tourist 
visas permit entry but not residency or work. And student 
visas permit residency but do not always allow work. In addi-
tion, some immigrants obtain fraudulent work documents, 
such as false Social Security numbers. For these reasons, 
“undocumented” is not an entirely accurate description of 
many immigrants’ situations.
 Second, for neutrality. The terms “illegal” and “undocu-
mented” are often politicized. By relying on “unauthorized,” 
we wish to move past old debates over language and push 
the public discussion about immigration into more objective, 
accurate, and—we hope—fruitful territory.
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requirements for an array of public assistance programs, but 
it might also require a minimum level of English-language 
proficiency. Following the passage of IRCA, the federal 
government offered grants to help state governments pro-
vide health and education services to the formerly unau-
thorized, and more recent immigration reform proposals 
have considered similar grants. California should lobby for 
a fair share of such funding—a share that should be based 
on the potential size of the legalizing population. 
Of course, there are many non-economic reasons 
to implement comprehensive immigration reform that 
includes legalization. Indeed, employment outcomes 
should not be the only—and perhaps not even the most 
important—consideration in weighing the potential 
benefits of a legalization program. Legalization could, for 
example, encourage active citizenship, including participa-
tion in and connection to the community; bring people out 
of the shadows; and prevent deportations that can separate 
families, including those with U.S.-born children.
Does Legalization Change 
Employment Outcomes?
Immigrants without LPR status or temporary work visas 
might have more limited employment options than those 
who are legally permitted to work. They might accept jobs 
that do not fully use their skills, which could depress their 
wages. Their jobs might be less stable or more dangerous, 
and they might be more subject to wage fraud. We might 
expect that newly legalized immigrants could find jobs where 
earnings are higher and conditions are better, either within 
the same occupation or in a new one. Indeed, research that 
followed immigrants given amnesty under IRCA found that 
their employment outcomes did improve after legalization. 
In this study, we provide additional evidence on the 
relationship between legalization and employment out-
comes. Specifically, we examine outcomes for immigrants 
who were granted LPR status in 2003, even though these 
immigrants gained their legal status not through a legal-
ization program but rather through the standard immigra-
tion channels already in existence. We compare outcomes 
for the three legal categories defined above: crossers, 
overstayers, and the continuously legal.2  
To learn whether acquiring LPR status leads to 
improvements in employment outcomes, we use immi-
grants’ self-reported occupation and wages. We begin 
with each immigrant’s first job after entering and living in 
this country (and before acquiring LPR status). We then 
examine the job each immigrant held at the time of the 
interview (after acquiring LPR status). 
Unauthorized Immigrants in the NIS
The NIS seeks to provide a nationally representative dataset 
of immigrants who have recently gained LPR status. It 
gathers detailed information on each respondent’s migra-
tion and employment history, educational attainment, 
English-language ability, entry visa, marital and family 
status, and other demographic characteristics. This infor-
mation allows us to trace the history of each respondent’s 
time in the United States, including any time that he or she 
may have lived or worked in this country before acquiring 
legal status. Since we expect LPR status to have different 
employment effects on immigrants with different prior 
legal statuses, educational levels, and language skills, these 
data provide us with an excellent opportunity to answer 
our research questions. 
The NIS does not focus solely on unauthorized immi-
grants; nor was it designed to be a representative sample of 
the unauthorized immigrant population. Rather, it focuses 
on the records of all foreign-born persons who gained LPR 
status between May and November 2003. The surveyed 
group includes respondents who violated immigration 
laws as well as those whose tenure in this country has been 
entirely legal. We find that the unauthorized portion of the 
NIS sample and other estimates of the unauthorized immi-
grant population are quite similar.3  
In our analysis we focus on respondents who reported 
their occupations in both the pre-LPR period and at the 
time of the interview. Roughly half of these 4,486 respon-
dents were continuously legal, and the remainder were fairly 
evenly split between crossers and overstayers (see Table 1). 
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Table 1. A breakdown of variables by pre-LPR legal status reveals significant differences
Variable Crosser Overstayer Continuously legal
Demographic trait    
Share of sample (%)
Female (%)
Married (%)
Mean number of children
Mean age at NIS interview
Mean age at first job during last U.S. trip
Mean duration of pre-LPR job (years)
Mean time elapsed since start of pre-LPR job (years)
25.9
36.8
67.8
2.3
35.8
24.8
3.8
11.0
27.6
45.8
80.7
1.6
37.1
31.2
2.5
5.9
46.4
44.4
75.5
1.2
35.0
32.3
1.4
2.7
Country of origin (%)
Mexico
Other Latin America and Caribbean
East Asia, South Asia, and Pacific
Sub-Saharan Africa
Europe and Central Asia
Middle East and North Africa
All other
38.5
50.1
4.5
0.8
2.5
1.0
2.6
16.4
29.0
18.0
8.3
18.7
5.4
4.1
3.0
18.5
38.8
8.2
22.1
5.0
4.4
admission classa (%)
Spouse of citizen
Child of citizen (younger than age 21, unmarried)
Parent of citizen
Child of citizen (age 21 plus and/or married)
Spouse of LPR
Sibling of citizen
Employment preference
Diversity lottery
Refugee/asylee
Legalization
Other
33.1
1.6
2.5
1.7
3.3
0.9
3.6
0.7
8.2
37.3
7.1
53.0
1.7
4.3
1.4
0.8
2.1
11.4
4.8
11.5
3.6
5.5
30.4
1.9
1.9
0.9
0.9
7.3
21.0
14.3
8.6
0.5
12.3
Helped by a relative to get current job (%) 
Current employer is a relative (%)
18.3
2.3
11.1
3.2
18.7
3.9
Human capital
Years of education
Years of education in the United States 
Less than high school diploma (%)
High school diploma (%)
Some college (%)
Bachelor’s degree or higher (%) 
9.5
1.3
61.7
22.6
8.6
7.2
13.7
1.0
22.9
28.7
12.9
35.4
14.3
0.9
20.8
21.1
10.2
48.0
Excellent English (%)
Very good English (%)
Good English (%)
14.4
7.9
32.8
31.1
8.8
29.0
28.8
7.7
26.8
Number of observations 945 1,071 2,470
Source: Authors’ calculations from the New Immigrant Survey.
aclass of immigrant admission refers to the way the immigrant acquires LPr status (family sponsored, employment preference, etc.). For more on this, see Monger and rytina (2009).
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These numbers are comparable to estimates of mode of entry 
among the total population of unauthorized immigrants 
in the nation, which suggest that approximately 50 percent 
crossed the border illegally, 45 percent overstayed a visa, and 
the remainder violated the terms of a border crossing card 
(Pew Hispanic Center, 2006). The average crosser was age 25 
when starting his or her first job in this country, compared 
to age 31 for overstayers and age 32 for the continuously 
legal. Nearly 90 percent of crossers and nearly 50 percent 
of overstayers came from Mexico or other Latin American 
countries, whereas the continuously legal were more likely to 
have come from Asia and Europe.
Although large portions of each group were admitted 
as the spouse or other relative of a U.S. citizen, there are 
differences in the other classes of admission. For example, 
21 percent of the continuously legal acquired legal status 
through employment preferences, whereas the same is true 
for only 11 percent of overstayers and 4 percent of crossers.  
But perhaps most striking are the differences in formal 
education. Crossers have an average of 9.5 years of formal 
education, overstayers have 13.7 years, and the continu-
ously legal have 14.3 years. These figures are reflected  
in the breakdown of educational levels—61.7 percent of  
crossers lack a high school diploma, whereas 48 percent  
of the continuously legal have a bachelor’s degree or higher. 
In addition, crossers are more likely to be men, to have 
more children, and to report lower levels of proficiency in 
English than their counterparts.
Occupational Mobility 
To arrive at a better understanding of the relationship 
between immigrant status and the labor market, we begin 
our analysis by comparing the occupational mobility of 
unauthorized workers (crossers and overstayers) to the 
mobility of immigrants with no unauthorized immigra-
tion history (the continuously legal). Of course, it is possible 
that immigrants sort themselves into these three groups 
through personal decisions and characteristics we cannot 
observe, but which affect their earnings in the period before 
acquiring LPR status, after earning LPR status, or both. 
In an effort to control for these unobservable factors, 
we consider the role of characteristics that we can observe 
(and which might serve as proxies for those that we can-
not observe)—for instance, the immigrant’s demographic 
characteristics, country of origin, year of entry into the 
United States, and the relationship or situation that made 
LPR status possible. For example, we might expect that 
social networks play an important role in employment out-
comes. We cannot directly observe these networks, but we 
can discern whether an immigrant works for a relative, had 
help from a relative in finding his or her current job, or was 
sponsored by a family member for admission to LPR status.
Our occupational mobility findings rely on earnings 
that we impute from the 2000 census, using the gender-
specific median earnings of foreign-born individuals in 
each occupation (referred to as “occupational earnings”). 
We measure occupational mobility in this way because 
imputed earnings allow us to evaluate occupational change 
in an easily understood metric. We first compare earnings 
differences observed across the three groups of immigrants 
at the time of their first U.S. jobs. We next compare the 
differences in earnings growth between their first U.S. jobs 
and the jobs held when they were interviewed some time 
after earning LPR status. We then factor in the observable 
characteristics listed in Table 1.4  
Most of the differences in earnings among immigrants who have not yet 
received green cards are explained by skills and demographics rather 
than legal status.
tim PAnnell/CorbiS
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First U.S. Job 
We expect average pre-LPR earnings from employment 
to be linked to the legal right to work. And, indeed, we 
find that unauthorized immigrants earned much less than 
those who were continuously legal. Figure 1 shows these 
substantial differences in unadjusted earnings. Among 
men, crossers were paid 31 percent less and overstayers  
13 percent less than their continuously legal counterparts. 
Among women, the respective differences were 28 percent 
and 10 percent.
Although differences in occupational earnings may 
be due to legal status, other factors play a significant role. 
Adjusting for demographic characteristics (age, marital 
status, number of children, and educational attainment), 
we find that the U.S. state of residence, year of arrival, 
and country of origin explain most of the differences in 
earnings between crossers and the continuously legal.5 
Factoring in the way these immigrants ultimately received 
their green cards (e.g., family sponsorship or employment) 
explains even more of the pre-LPR differences. In short, 
most of the differences in occupational earnings before 
immigrants receive their green cards are explained by  
skill and demographic factors rather than by legal status.  
The “adjusted” occupational earnings in Figure 1 show 
that among men, only 12 percent of the difference in 
occupational earnings at the first U.S. job between the 
continuously legal and crossers, and only 10 percent of the 
difference between the continuously legal and overstayers, 
remain unexplained. For women, the respective figures  
are 8 percent and 7 percent.
Occupational Mobility to Post-LPR Job 
Because we can observe immigrants before and after they 
achieve LPR status, we can measure occupational mobility 
by comparing the occupational earnings from an immi-
grant’s first job with those from the job held at the time of 
the interview (soon after an immigrant gained LPR status).6 
This comparison reveals that the occupational earnings of 
all three groups of immigrants increased (Table 2). Over-
stayers increased their occupational earnings by nearly 
$3,700, the largest dollar amount of all three groups, but 
crossers increased their occupational earnings by a greater 
percentage (21%). The continuously legal still earned more 
than either group in the post-LPR job, but they had the 
smallest gains, both in dollars and in percentage gains. 
The higher rate of occupational earnings growth found 
among the two formerly unauthorized groups may be due 
to their change in legal status, but other factors may also 
play a role, as was the case in the earnings differences prior 
to gaining LPR status. We again consider other possible 
factors, such as demographic characteristics (for example, 
educational attainment and English-language skills), U.S. 
state of residence, country of origin, class of immigrant 
admission, use of social networks in finding employment, 
and time spent in the United States.7 
Accounting for variations in demographic factors and 
state of residence across the three groups does not greatly 
diminish the gap in occupational earnings growth between 
Figure 1. Personal characteristics and other factors explain much 
of the occupational earnings difference in first U.S. jobs
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Although differences in occupational earnings 
may be due to legal status,  
other factors play a significant role. 
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the two formerly unauthorized groups and those who were 
continuously legal (Figure 2 shows the results for men). The 
gap remains around 12 percent after adding these factors. 
However, once we also consider year of arrival, the gains of 
crossers relative to the continuously legal disappear, whereas 
many of the gains for overstayers remain (about 7%). Add-
ing measures of country of origin and class of admission 
does not change the size of this gap. The results fail to reveal 
greater occupational earnings growth among either female 
crossers or female overstayers than for their continuously 
legal counterparts.8 
We conclude from this analysis that former crossers  
make great gains in their post-LPR jobs relative to their 
first U.S. jobs (and relative to the continuously legal) 
mainly because they have been in the United States longer 
on average (11 years since their first U.S. job versus nearly 
3 years; see Table 1) and have worked longer in their pre-
LPR occupations. This longer time in the United States 
may have allowed them to gain valuable labor market 
experience, which leads to higher occupational earnings. 
Restricting the sample to all immigrants who have lived 
in the United States for only 5 years or less also shows that 
crossers do not experience occupational mobility attribut-
able to gaining legal status.9 In sum, for crossers, the occu-
pational mobility gains from legalization are negligible; for 
overstayers, the gains are positive but relatively small.
Why, then, are overstayers able to make gains after 
being granted legal status, while crossers apparently are 
not? The most likely explanation is that immigrants who 
enter the United States without documentation generally 
have many fewer years of schooling and lower self-reported 
English-language skills. Over 60 percent of crossers do 
not have a high school diploma, compared to 23 percent 
of overstayers and 21 percent of the continuously legal 
(see Table 1). Only 14 percent of crossers report excellent 
English-language ability, compared to 31 percent of over-
stayers. Lack of legal status might hinder earnings oppor-
tunities for overstayers—the more highly skilled group—
but not for the less skilled (who generally start with a 
lower base of earnings in their first job). Possible reasons 
might include difference in hiring practices for skilled and 
unskilled jobs, different opportunities for advancement 
with skilled and unskilled jobs, or different obstacles to 
exiting one occupation and entering another. 
How important is education in explaining differences 
in occupational mobility between crossers and overstayers? 
To answer this question, we construct a test where we 
consider the role of educational attainment more explicitly 
for both types of formerly unauthorized LPRs. We find 
that educational attainment is more important than type 
Table 2. Median annual occupational earnings increase more for formerly unauthorized immigrants
Crosser Overstayer Continuously legal
First U.S. job $15,160 $19,727 $23,913 
Job at post-LPR interview $18,272 $23,418 $25,613 
Change $3,112 $3,692 $1,700 
Source: Authors’ calculations from the New Immigrant Survey and the 2000 census.
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SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from the New Immigrant Survey and the 2000 census.
** Indicates statistically significantly different growth at the 1% level.
and
country
of origin
and
year of
arrival
and 
demographic
characteristics
and state
Legal
status
and
class of
admission
Crosser
Overstayer** ** **
**
** ** **
Types of control added in each model
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
–2
–4
Figure 2. Year of arrival in the United States explains occupational 
earnings gains for crossers (results for men)
9Immigrant Legalization
www.ppic.org
of unauthorized experience in explaining occupational and 
earnings changes after achieving LPR status. Whether they 
are crossers or overstayers, immigrants with less than a 
high school education demonstrate no statistically reliable 
occupational mobility relative to the gains experienced 
by the continuously legal (Figure 3).10 The same is true for 
high school graduates in both groups. And although we 
find that those in both unauthorized groups with “some 
college experience” are more occupationally mobile than 
the continuously legal, the evidence is not statistically  
reliable. However, we do find that the earnings gains for 
those with at least a college degree compare favorably to 
the continuously legal: 9 percent for crossers and nearly  
11 percent for overstayers. 
Wage Growth
As we have seen, earnings imputed from reported occu-
pations indicate that high skill is associated with upward 
occupational mobility for the formerly unauthorized.  
But does a crosser or an overstayer earn more after legal-
ization if he or she remains in the same occupation? For 
example, LPR status might allow an immigrant working 
as an unauthorized housecleaner in a private home to find 
work as a unionized hotel maid. 
To answer this question, we turn to the self-reported 
wage data of the NIS cohort. We find no statistically reliable 
association between prior legal status and self-reported 
wages at the first U.S. job.11 And when we estimate wage 
growth between the first U.S. job and the post-LPR job, we 
do not find a relationship between being a crosser or over-
stayer and wage growth, relative to the continuously legal.12 
The potential for recall bias is greater among crossers  
than among the continuously legal, because the time 
between their first U.S. job and their self-reports was, on 
average, 11 and 3 years, respectively. We therefore con-
ducted another test of wage growth within occupations. 
Restricting our analysis to immigrants in low-skill occu-
pations (reducing our sample size to approximately 500), 
we compared reported wages at the time of the post-LPR 
interview, which should not be subject to recall bias. We 
found that crossers and overstayers in low-skill occupations 
earn no more than—and therefore did not gain relative to—
the continuously legal in these same low-skill occupations. 
Thus, we conclude that low-skill unauthorized immigrants 
do not make wage gains within their low-skill occupations 
after earning LPR status.13
Jobs, Job Conditions, and Job Searches 
Although we are only able to observe the new LPRs for a 
relatively short time, we know that some changed occu-
pations after their first U.S. job. However, many crossers 
report being employed as low-skill workers, such as maids, 
dishwashers, and construction laborers (Table 3). Two 
occupations stand out in terms of job exits for crossers: 
dishwashing and child care. In fact, no crossers who were 
dishwashers before earning LPR status remained in that 
occupation after earning LPR status.14 Former dishwashers 
were most likely to move to other jobs in the food service 
industry, and former child care workers were most likely 
to transition to jobs as maids and housekeepers. Although 
these low-skill workers seldom moved into higher-paying 
jobs, it is possible that benefits or other nonfinancial 
aspects of the jobs improved.15 
Many overstayers also worked in very low-skill occu-
pations in their first U.S. jobs. The highest rates of exit were 
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* Indicates statistically significantly different growth at the 5% level.
** Indicates statistically significantly different growth at the 1% level.
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among those working as grounds maintenance laborers, 
cashiers, and janitors or building cleaners. Grounds main-
tenance laborers who changed jobs generally moved on to 
work as painters, inspectors, or welding operators. Cashiers 
who changed jobs became retail salespersons, receptionists, 
or health care aides. In contrast, the top ten occupations 
among continuously legal immigrants include some very 
highly skilled jobs, such as software engineers, postsecond-
ary school teachers, and registered nurses, both before and 
after earning LPR status. Rates of job exit for this group are 
low (over 60% in the top ten occupations were in the same 
occupation before and after earning LPR status).
Although we observe no improvements in occupations 
or earnings for crossers, it is possible that job conditions or 
the nonfinancial aspects of their jobs might improve after 
legalization. Ideally, we would like to be able to measure  
Occupation
Crosser Overstayer Continuously legal
rank
% in 
first 
u.S.  
job
% in  
different 
job at LPr 
interview
% in job 
post-LPr rank
% in 
first 
u.S. 
 job
% in  
different 
job at LPr 
interview
% in job 
post-LPr rank
% in 
first 
u.S.  
job
% in  
different 
job at LPr 
interview
% in job 
post-LPr
Maids and  
housekeepers 1 7.4 57.7 7.2 2 4.4 55.6 3.4 4 3.4 22.5 2.9
Agricultural workers 2 7.3 71.9 2.7    
Janitors and  
building cleaners 3 6.0 75.5 5.5 3 3.7 73.9 2.2 5 3.3 39.7 3.6
Dishwashers 4 5.2 100.0 0.5    
Child care workers 5 5.1 86.7 1.6 7 3.0 55.7 2.2  
Cooks 6 4.4 71.8 5.0 4 3.4 47.3 3.1  
Construction laborers 7 4.1 68.1 3.0 8 2.3 71.9 1.7  
Cashiers 8 3.7 77.8 2.7 1 5.9 76.1 2.7 1 5.9 34.6 5.0
Grounds maintenance 
workers 9 3.5 63.5 2.4 10 2.0 86.1 0.3  
Sewing machine 
operators 10 2.5 73.0 1.0    
Retail salespersons   5 3.3 63.1 3.6 8 2.4 37.9 2.5
Waiters and waitresses   6 3.3 66.7 2.6 3 3.4 49.0 2.1
Nursing, psychiatric, 
and home health aides   9 2.0 42.9 3.0 7 2.5 39.4 2.8
Computer software 
engineers     2 3.9 27.2 4.3
Postsecondary 
teachers     6 3.0 63.0 1.7
Registered nurses     9 2.4 20.1 2.4
Stock clerks and  
order fillers     10 2.3 47.7 1.7
Totals 49.2 74.3 31.5 33.2 64.4 24.8 32.6 37.6 29.1
Source: Authors’ calculations from the New Immigrant Survey.
Table 3. Crossers are the most likely to change occupations
11Immigrant Legalization
www.ppic.org
differences between benefits in the first U.S. jobs and post-
LPR jobs, but we are able to compare benefits only at the jobs 
held by members of the three legal status groups at the time 
they were interviewed. The few measures available in the NIS 
data do not suggest a systematic association of legal status 
with job quality as measured by benefits. A higher percentage 
of crossers than of the continuously legal were offered insur-
ance through their jobs (75% versus 65%), but there were no 
real differences in the percentage who were offered paid vaca-
tion or long-term disability coverage (see Table 4).
Previous research suggests that some job conditions 
improve with legalization in ways that we cannot measure 
in this study. For example, Gass Kandilov and Kandilov 
(2009) found that legal agricultural workers are more likely 
than unauthorized agricultural workers to receive health 
care coverage and bonuses. And a study of low-skill labor-
ers in three major metropolitan areas by Bernhardt et al. 
(2009) found that rates of workers experiencing minimum 
wage violations in the previous week were highest among 
unauthorized immigrant women (47%) and lowest among 
native workers of both sexes (approximately 18%). 
Perhaps it takes newly legalized immigrants some time 
to get a better job. To examine this possibility, we look at 
several questions in the NIS about whether immigrants 
are looking for work and whether that work is the same 
or different from the type of work in which they are cur-
rently engaged. We find that the continuously legal are the 
most likely to respond that they are looking for another 
job (30%) and that crossers are the least likely (23%; see 
Table 5). Among those who are looking for work, crossers 
or overstayers report looking for a “different kind of work” 
in slightly higher percentages (61% and 58% for crossers 
and overstayers, respectively, and 52% for the continuously 
legal, although the differences are not statistically signifi-
cant). This may mean that crossers who are looking for 
work are less satisfied with their current occupations than 
are the continuously legal.
It is possible that improvement in occupation depends 
on increased training and improvement in English-language 
skills. At the time of the interview, which ranged from  
4 to 13 months after gaining LPR status, the two groups 
of formerly unauthorized immigrants were no more likely 
to be enrolled in school than were the continuously legal 
(Table 6). A more detailed analysis that considers the role 
of other important predictive factors also indicates no dif-
ferences by legal status.16 It is possible that school enroll-
ment among post-LPR crossers and overstayers would 
increase over time. But since these crossers and overstayers 
Table 4. Benefits on the job do not differ much by former legal status
Benefit Crosser Overstayer Continuously legal
Insurance through job (%) 74.8 78.8 65.3 
Paid vacation (%) 61.0 63.3 59.2 
Long-term disability coverage (%) 38.6 43.1 40.7 
Source: Authors’ calculations from the New Immigrant Survey.
Table 5. Among those looking for another job, crossers are slightly more likely to be seeking other kinds of work
 Crosser Overstayer Continuously legal
Looking for another job (%) 22.6 28.1 30.2 
Of those looking, seeking a  
different kind of work (%) 61.4 57.9 52.1 
Source: Authors’ calculations from the New Immigrant Survey.
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should have anticipated their acquisition of LPR status well 
in advance (because they had a pending application), they 
might have invested in U.S. education already. 
Thus, it appears that job conditions do not improve 
markedly for immigrants after legalization, at least in the 
ways that we can measure and in the short term. In the 
long term, improvements may be found as immigrants 
change jobs and gain skills. However, in the 4 to 13 months 
after becoming LPRs, most immigrants are not looking for 
work, nor are they investing in education that would help 
them qualify for better jobs.
What Do These Findings Suggest 
for a Legalization Program?
Only a small proportion of upward occupational mobil-
ity can be attributed to legalization and only for formerly 
unauthorized immigrants with higher levels of educa-
tion. Further, self-reported wage growth does not appear 
to be associated with legalization. This casts doubt on 
the idea that a legalization program would, in fact, lead 
to improved occupations and higher wages for unautho-
rized immigrants. Our findings differ from those of earlier 
research on the effects of IRCA (which granted amnesty 
to nearly 3 million unauthorized immigrants). In explor-
ing these differences, we first discuss the magnitude of the 
IRCA results, and we then consider the effects of a longer 
time frame for observing gains, the challenges of designing 
research that can isolate the effect of legalization, and the 
role of employer sanctions.
Results from IRCA
Prior research found greater gains to becoming legal after 
working in the United States without proper documen-
tation than we do in this study. This research followed 
immigrants who were legalized as a result of IRCA in 1986 
for four years, as reported in the Legalized Population 
Survey (1992). Estimates using these survey data find earn-
ings gains for men of 15 percentage points (Rivera-Batiz, 
1999), 9 percentage points (Amuedo-Dorantes, Bansak, 
and Rafael, 2007), and 6 percentage points (Kossoudji 
and Cobb-Clark, 2002). Studies comparing the earnings 
of unauthorized agricultural workers to the earnings of 
agricultural workers with LPR status find differences of 
4 percent (Pena, 2010) and 5 percent (Gass Kandilov and 
Kandilov, 2009). Although these studies considered differ-
ent variables, they typically factored in time spent in the 
United States, education, and English-language skills. 
Time Horizon
Studies conducted after the IRCA legalization relied on 
data collected for about four years after the formerly  
unauthorized acquired legal status. We measure occupa-
tional mobility (using imputed earnings) and self-reported 
wages soon after LPR status was granted. Although 
employment outcomes may improve as more time passes 
Table 6. School enrollment is low among all groups 
Crosser Overstayer Continuously legal
Enrolled in English classes (%) 10.9 13.2 14.0 
Enrolled in other classes (%) 8.1 11.6 10.5 
Enrolled in English or other 
classes (%) 16.5 21.4 21.0 
Source: Authors’ calculations from the New Immigrant Survey.
It appears that job conditions do not improve 
markedly for immigrants after legalization. 
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after legalization, our research with the sample at hand does 
not suggest that they will. Most of the occupational earn-
ings and wage differences between previously unauthorized 
and continuously legal immigrants at the time of their first 
job are explained by skill-level differences.17 Although we 
observe some change between the first U.S. job and the cur-
rent job, we find that the formerly unauthorized were not 
any more likely than the continuously legal to be looking 
for new jobs or new types of jobs. We also find that the for-
merly unauthorized were no more likely than the continu-
ously legal to be building English-language or other skills 
outside the workforce (through schooling).
Isolating the Effect of Legalization 
To measure the effect of legalization on occupation and 
wage growth, we need to distinguish growth that is due 
to the policy change from growth that is due to change 
in the economy or other factors unrelated to legaliza-
tion. Researchers attempt to separate these issues not by 
measuring absolute wage growth of the group expected to 
experience the policy change but by comparing the wage 
growth for that group to that for a presumably similar 
group not expected to experience the policy change. The 
difference can be thought of as the growth attributed to  
the policy change.
In our research, we compare crossers and overstayers 
to the continuously legal immigrants who acquired LPR 
status at the same time as our sample but who were autho-
rized to work in this country before receiving their green 
cards. We expect that the two groups of formerly unau-
thorized workers and the continuously legal would have 
experienced general growth in the economy in the same 
way and thus we seek to attribute remaining changes in 
occupational mobility and wages experienced by crossers 
and overstayers to legalization.
It is also true that no matter how targeted policy 
changes are designed to be, they rarely affect only the group 
they were intended to help. In our study, the continuously 
legal group might not provide us with a perfect compari-
son, because its members may have also experienced gains 
in occupational mobility after acquiring LPR status. For 
example, if they were able to change employers after transi-
tioning from an H1-B visa to LPR status, their occupational 
mobility and wages may rise. However, the NIS data do not 
indicate any increase in the wages of our continuously legal 
sample after acquiring LPR status (once we account for such 
factors as number of years in the United States).18
In previous research on the IRCA era, attributing the 
wage growth of the previously unauthorized to legalization  
may have been even more challenging. IRCA legalized 
nearly 3 million low-skill workers and, in doing so, dramat-
ically increased the supply of workers who were both low-
skill and legal. At the same time, new employer sanctions 
against the hiring of unauthorized workers were toughened. 
Each of these actions could have affected both the targeted 
group (the formerly unauthorized) and the likely compari-
son groups: (1) the low-skill workers who were legal before 
and after IRCA and (2) the low-skill immigrant workers 
who remained unauthorized after IRCA. 
Comparing the wages of formerly unauthorized low-
skill workers to those of low-skill workers who were legal 
workers both before and after IRCA might make wage 
growth appear greater than it is. Because IRCA legalized 
so many immigrants, the supply of legal low-skill workers 
may have increased sufficiently that the wages of the group 
that was legal before IRCA might have actually fallen 
after IRCA. Thus, the gap between the two groups appears 
smaller, but this is in part because the wages of one group 
have fallen while the wages of the other have risen. Not all 
of the convergence between groups can be attributed to 
growth in the wages of the formerly unauthorized. Simi-
larly, the introduction of sanctions against the hiring of 
Although employment outcomes  
may improve as more time passes  
after legalization, our research does not  
suggest that they will. 
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No matter how targeted policy changes  
are designed to be, they rarely affect  
only the group they were intended to help.
unauthorized workers makes employers less willing to  
pay unauthorized workers as much as they would receive in 
the absence of sanctions. This means that these workers are 
an inappropriate comparison group, because the relatively 
higher wages of previously unauthorized workers at least 
partly represent the worsening conditions for unauthorized 
workers. In both instances, the result would be an overesti-
mation of the effect of legalization. An alternative approach 
of using a group not affected by the amnesty may seem 
like a reasonable strategy. However, such a group may be 
differentially affected by changes in the economy or other 
relevant factors that may change over time.
Not surprisingly, the results of previous studies are 
sensitive to the choice of comparison group, as seen in the 
wide range of relative gains reported above. The study that 
compares earnings for unauthorized immigrants after 
legalization to, arguably, the most appropriate group (rela-
tively young Latino men with limited labor market expe-
rience) finds the smallest effects of legalization on wages 
(Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark, 2002). However, even this 
group may have been negatively affected by IRCA (Bansak 
and Raphael, 2001), and the downward pressure on the 
comparison group may thus lead to overstating the benefits 
of acquiring legal status.  
Strength of Employer Sanctions
We also consider earnings gains separately for crossers and 
overstayers, which is not the case in those studies finding 
larger gains in earnings (Rivera-Batiz, 1999; Amuedo-
Dorantes, Bansak, and Raphael, 2007). Immediately fol-
lowing IRCA’s implementation, employers of all types were 
probably concerned about the employer sanctions that were 
part of the legislation. In the current era, employers of the 
highly skilled are more likely than employers of low-skill 
workers to worry about employment law violations. This 
should have different effects on the wages and job oppor-
tunities for high-skill (mostly overstayers) and low-skill 
(mostly crossers) unauthorized workers. 
Employers of low-skill workers probably correctly 
assess the very low probability that they will ever be caught 
or fined for having hired unauthorized workers. The rela-
tively ineffective sanctions mean that employers do not pay 
low-skill laborers differently because of their legal status. 
In the period immediately following IRCA, employers 
likely expected that the newly approved employer sanc-
tions for hiring unauthorized workers would have teeth. 
That does not appear to be the case now. Indeed, because 
we find that there are no real differences in occupational 
mobility or reported wages between low-skill unauthorized  
immigrants (who are primarily crossers) and low-skill 
continuously legal immigrants, it appears that employers 
correctly assess the odds of being sanctioned for hiring 
undocumented workers as low and pay all low-skill workers 
the same low rates. 
Employers of high-skill workers might be more likely 
to be caught if they violate employment law. The cost of the 
fines and of losing a trained employee because of employ-
ment law violations might be too great for such employers, 
and they might avoid hiring unauthorized workers in the 
first place. After a high-skill unauthorized immigrant gains 
legal status, he or she could successfully apply for jobs that 
were formerly closed off. Because our study separates high-
skill workers (mostly overstayers) from low-skill workers 
(mostly crossers), we may be in a position to observe an 
effect of employer sanctions on the occupational mobility 
and reported wages of unauthorized overstayers after they 
become legal.
Legalization Today
Our findings are more in line with the more conservative 
estimates of occupational and wage gains estimated in the 
earlier studies of IRCA. We believe that the job prospects 
of formerly unauthorized immigrants with higher levels  
of skill and education would improve under a legalization 
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program. These higher-skilled immigrants are more likely to 
be overstayers than crossers. However, recent studies estimate 
that the group with the greatest expected earnings growth—
those with a bachelor’s degree or higher—constitute a rela-
tively small share of the unauthorized immigrant population, 
just 15 percent in 2008 (Passel and Cohn, 2009). 
It seems unlikely that the employment outcomes of 
low-skill unauthorized immigrants will improve unless 
they are able to improve their skill levels.19 Nearly half 
of the unauthorized immigrants in this country do not 
have a high school education. In 2008, 29 percent were 
estimated to have less than a ninth grade education, and 
an additional 18 percent had some high school education 
but did not graduate (Passel and Cohn, 2009). We believe 
that the earnings of low-skill workers do not improve after 
legalization partly because the threat of employer sanc-
tions is ineffective. If the threat were effective, employers 
would value low-skill legal workers more than low-skill 
unauthorized workers, but that does not appear to be the 
case. Another critical factor to consider will be the role 
of the economy. This particular sample of crossers and 
overstayers was granted LPR status in 2003, during an 
economic boom. Should legalization occur in 2010 (or 
even thereafter, depending on the duration of the currently 
depressed economy), employment and wage gains are likely 
to be even smaller. Thus, we believe that unless low-skill 
unauthorized immigrants can increase their skill levels, 
they are unlikely to see any improvement in their employ-
ment outcomes. However, employment outcomes should 
not be the only consideration, or perhaps even the most 
important consideration, in weighing the potential benefits 
of a legalization program.
How Might Legalization Affect 
the Larger Economy?
Many believe that legalizing 12 million unauthorized immi-
grants will profoundly affect not only the immigrants and 
their families but also the general economy of this nation. In 
this section, we consider the effects of legalization on three 
areas: native workers’ wages, public assistance programs, 
and tax revenues. It is also worth noting that newly legalized 
immigrants may invest more in their U.S. communities than 
they did before earning legal status. Legal immigrants are 
less likely to move within the United States than are unau-
thorized immigrants (Passel and Cohn, 2009). After legal-
izing through IRCA, Mexican immigrants were less likely 
to send money to Mexico, and if they did remit they sent 
less than when they were unauthorized (Amuedo-Dorantes 
and Mazzolari, forthcoming 2010). 
Labor Market Outcomes for Natives
Previous research has suggested that the impact of immi-
gration on native workers is linked to their skill level. Most 
research points toward a negligible effect on native high-
skill workers (Borjas, 2003; Orrenius and Zavodny, 2007), 
whereas low-skill U.S. workers may suffer in competition 
with low-skill immigrants (Borjas, 2003; Orrenius and 
Zavodny, 2007; Peri, 2007). Because we find little change 
in occupations or wages after legalizing, we do not believe 
that the legalization of immigrants would affect the wages 
of natives. In the short term, we do not expect that a legal-
ization program would increase competition with either 
Legalization alone is unlikely to improve employment outcomes for  
low-skill workers.
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natives or previously legal low-skill immigrants, nor do 
we expect shortages in occupations that currently employ 
a high proportion of these workers. In the longer term, if 
formerly unauthorized low-skill immigrants improve their 
skills and can compete with low-skill natives, it is possible 
that wages for the latter two groups might decline. However, 
we do not observe widespread investments in education by 
the formerly unauthorized, at least in the short term.
Public Assistance Programs 
In almost all cases, unauthorized immigrant adults are  
ineligible for public assistance, including such programs as 
Food Stamps and Temporary Assistance for Needy Fami-
lies (TANF). Yet there is concern among some of the public 
and policymakers that unauthorized immigrants are find-
ing a way to receive benefits through these programs. In 
California, there is a movement to place an initiative on the 
ballot that would strip benefits from the citizen children  
of unauthorized immigrants (Watanabe, 2009). 
In the 1990s, there was public concern that recent 
immigrants, especially those legalized under IRCA, were 
relying heavily on public assistance through programs 
such as Aid to Families with Dependent Children. In fact, 
states did receive State Legalization Impact Assistance 
Grants (SLIAG) from the federal government to help defer 
the costs of newly legalized immigrants. However, the  
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconcilia-
tion Act of 1996 specifically denied benefits to immigrants 
who have had LPR status for fewer than five years.20 Family 
sponsors of new LPR immigrants had to “deem” part of 
their income toward support of the new immigrants, effec-
tively raising the incomes of the new LPRs. 
The rules barring welfare receipt for recent immigrants 
are still in place and would probably be included in any 
new legislation that provides a pathway to legalization for 
the currently unauthorized. Means-tested federal benefit 
programs for which new LPRs and unauthorized immi-
grants are ineligible include Food Stamps (now called the 
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program or SNAP), 
Supplemental Security Income, TANF, and Medicaid. 
The only exceptions for unauthorized immigrants are for 
pregnant women—who can receive Medicaid—and children 
under age 18. Citizen children are eligible for benefits. 
States may choose to use their own funding under these 
programs to assist some types of immigrants ineligible 
under federal law. In California, for example, the children 
of unauthorized immigrants can receive assistance through 
CalWORKs, the state version of TANF. 
Thus, almost all new LPRs or immigrants who receive 
legal status through a legalization program would remain 
ineligible for federal public assistance in the short run, 
with the possible exception of the Earned Income Tax 
Credit (EITC). However, here we consider the family 
incomes of the newly legalized and compare them to the 
approximate TANF and SNAP eligibility rates at those 
levels of income in U.S. households to demonstrate the 
gap between eligibility and potential need. There are two 
important caveats. First, TANF eligibility is not deter-
mined by poverty alone but rather by a complex series of 
calculations that measure different types of income and 
assets. Second, our measure of poverty is imperfect. We 
consider only the income of married or partnered adults. 
We do not include income from children or other coresi-
dent family members, assistance from outside the house-
hold, or a few other, less common sources of income that 
are not reported in the NIS. 
We find high rates of poverty among our sample of 
NIS adults who were working both before and after earn-
ing LPR status. Using 2004 data, Passel (2009) estimated 
that only 21 percent of unauthorized adults were living in 
poverty. However, using our measures, we find that roughly 
a quarter of overstayers and crossers and 44 percent of the 
continuously legal were living in poverty, as depicted by the 
orange and dark blue bars in Figure 4. Most of those who 
are poor are concentrated below 50 percent of the federal 
poverty level. However, in the case of the continuously legal, 
it is likely that the NIS estimates do not accurately reflect 
the economic conditions of their families.21 
Former overstayers are most likely to have family  
incomes above 200 percent of the poverty threshold, with 
nearly 60 percent of them having incomes this high, com-
pared to 43 percent of former crossers. We find that a major-
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ity in all groups have family incomes above 130 percent of 
the poverty threshold (an approximation for Food Stamp 
eligibility): 64 percent of crossers, 73 percent of overstayers, 
and 60 percent of the continuously legal.
Although these measures are inexact, few families 
with incomes in excess of 130 percent of the poverty level 
qualify for TANF or SNAP (Food Stamps). Rangarajan, 
Castner, and Clark (2005) reported that only 8 percent of 
these families were eligible for TANF and 4 percent were 
eligible for SNAP, using estimates from household models 
of program participation (Table 7). At the other end of the 
spectrum, families with incomes below 50 percent of the 
poverty level were very likely to be eligible for TANF (83%) 
and SNAP (76%). 
Recall that the vast majority of newly legalized immi-
grants would not be eligible for TANF or SNAP in their 
first five years, regardless of their poverty status or need. 
And NIS data suggest that there is little or no evidence that 
immigrants who are ineligible are finding ways to circum-
vent the system and receive benefits. We find that only  
3.9 percent receive Food Stamps, although a larger number 
are probably eligible, based on their status as former refu-
gees or through eligible children. 
It seems likely that the only benefit most new legalized 
immigrants would be eligible for would be EITC, which can 
be claimed on federal tax returns by low-income workers. 
The aim of the EITC is to increase work participation and 
work effort while also alleviating poverty for working-poor 
families. Immigrants currently filing federal tax returns 
with Tax Payer Identification numbers or invalid Social 
Security numbers are not eligible for EITC. However, a 
high percentage of unauthorized immigrants work, and 
many live in poverty (Figure 4), and so, at the time of legal-
ization and receiving a valid Social Security number, newly 
legalized immigrants could file for EITC (Camarota, 2001). 
Tax Receipts
Unauthorized immigrants pay a variety of taxes, although 
probably at different rates than legal immigrants and 
natives. The unauthorized pay sales taxes and income taxes 
and contribute to Social Security (which they cannot claim); 
it is estimated that as of 2002, they have paid hundreds 
of billions of dollars to Social Security (Chairman of the 
Council of Economic Advisors, 2005). The NIS data indi-
cate that a substantial share of unauthorized immigrants 
report filing federal taxes in the year before earning LPR 
status. It should be noted that our estimates rely on the self-
reports of a group who may feel an incentive to overreport 
compliance with federal law. However, given that 26 percent 
of immigrants in our sample reported having crossed the 
border without documentation (Table 1), it seems likely that 
interviewees felt comfortable in the interview and would 
have accurately reporting their tax-paying behavior. This 
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SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from the New Immigrant Survey and the 2000 Census.
Crosser Overstayer Continuously legal
Legal status
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Figure 4. Many new LPR families live in poverty
% of federal poverty level
Table 7. Many new LPR families would receive public assistance if 
their immigration status allowed it
Household income as a 
percentage of the federal 
poverty level
Percentage of  
u.S. households eligible
TaNF SNaP
Less than 50 83 76
50 to 99 33 74
100 to 129 16 54
130 to 200 8 4
Source: rangarajan, castner, and clark (2005).
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after legalization, but this would result from increased com-
pliance (which is already high) rather than from substantial 
increases in earnings. For this reason, we expect that any 
overall increase in tax revenues would be small.
Conclusion
Legalization of the estimated 12 million unauthorized 
immigrants residing in the United States would lead to 
both economic benefits and costs for the nation. Some 
arguments for comprehensive immigration reform suggest 
that legalizing immigrants will help end the current reces-
sion. This seems unlikely. Our research suggests that ear-
lier findings from the IRCA era may overstate anticipated 
earnings from a new reform, at least in the short run. 
We do expect occupational mobility to improve for 
formerly unauthorized immigrants with higher skill levels. 
When compared to the continuously legal, their occupa-
tional earnings growth was about 9 to 10 percent. These 
higher-skill unauthorized immigrants are more likely to 
be overstayers than crossers, but unauthorized immigrants 
with college degrees are found in both groups. Lower-skill 
unauthorized immigrants are not likely to experience 
strong occupational mobility as a result of a legalization 
program (although their occupational earnings grow over 
time in the United States). It will be important that any 
new legislation give legalized immigrants incentives to 
improve their skills, especially in English. 
The majority of studies investigating the effect of  
legalizing immigrants on natives’ earnings suggest that  
the effects are slightly negative for workers with low skill  
group of unauthorized immigrants may also be more likely 
to have filed federal taxes than unauthorized immigrants 
who were not just a year away from becoming LPRs. Thus, 
our estimates may overstate the tax-paying rates of the gen-
eral population of unauthorized immigrants.
Our estimates suggest that 87 percent of former  
crossers and 91 percent of overstayers filed federal tax 
returns in 2002 (Table 8). Only 59 percent of continuously 
legal immigrants filed taxes in 2002, but this lower per-
centage is due in part to the much lower percentage that 
were required to do so. In estimating whether a family was 
required to file a federal tax return in 2002, we consider 
family structure, gross income, and the tax-filing thresholds 
in 2002.22 We find that both groups of formerly unauthor-
ized immigrants appear to file federal taxes at rates higher 
than those who are required to (i.e., many earned less than 
the minimum 2002 tax filing threshold for their family size 
and composition but filed federal tax returns anyway). 
Once we control for who is required to file taxes, we 
find that tax payment rates increase very slightly. The con-
tinuously legal were the least likely to report having filed tax 
returns in 2002 after controlling for whether or not their 
income met the tax-filing threshold, and overstayers were 
the most likely, at 94 percent. It seems likely that income  
tax revenues at the state and federal levels would increase 
Table 8. Most unauthorized immigrants filed 2002 federal tax returns
Crosser Overstayer Continuously legal
Required to file (%) 80.3 82.1 58.0 
Filed federal taxes (%) 87.0 90.5 58.5 
Filing as a % of required (%) 90.3 94.1 85.0 
Source: Authors’ calculations from the New Immigrant Survey.
Our estimates suggest that 87 percent 
of former crossers and 91 percent of overstayers 
filed federal tax returns in 2002.
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levels. Since we find no improvements in occupational 
mobility or wages for the lowest skill levels in the short 
run, we do not expect that legalizing immigrants would 
place any increased pressure on the wages of low-skill 
natives or low-skill legal immigrants. Tax revenues may 
increase, although many unauthorized immigrants already 
file federal and state tax returns and pay sales and payroll 
taxes. We found that about 90 percent of unauthorized 
immigrants filed federal tax returns in the year before 
gaining LPR status. We expect that increases in tax reve-
nues resulting from increased earnings among the for-
merly unauthorized would be modest.
Although we find that only 4 to 5 percent of formerly 
unauthorized immigrants participate in SNAP, their low 
income levels suggest that a higher percentage are actually 
eligible. We note that EITC filing may increase. One ques-
tion that often arises is whether the currently unauthorized 
will use Food Stamps and other public assistance programs 
in greater proportion if they become legal. This will depend 
largely on how legislation is written. Currently, new LPRs 
are barred from receiving TANF in many states, although 
some states, such as California, do provide benefits to the 
children of new immigrants (including the children of 
the unauthorized). Signature gatherers have been working 
recently to place an initiative on the ballot to deny these 
benefits in California. Massachusetts is considering reduc-
ing some types of health care coverage for those holding 
LPR status for less than five years (Goodnough, 2009). 
How benefits will be used by newly legalized immi-
grants may depend more on legislation determining their 
eligibility than on their incomes and assets. The federal and 
state governments will need to weigh the cost of providing 
benefits against the benefit of providing them. In planning 
for comprehensive immigration reform, it will be important 
to weigh the need to require that newly legalized immi-
grants become self-sufficient members of society against the 
evidently low levels of resources available within their fami-
lies. The costs of not ensuring minimum levels of well-being 
will ultimately be borne by the children of the formerly 
unauthorized, many of whom are already U.S. citizens. 
Finally, after IRCA, the federal government provided 
states with funding through SLIAG to help state and 
local governments provide public assistance (including 
education) to the formerly unauthorized. Research has 
shown that states such as California, with large numbers 
of immigrants, are likely to disproportionately bear the 
costs of immigration, while the federal government retains 
most of the benefits (National Research Council, 1997). It 
is imperative that California be prepared to meet the new 
resource demands of a legalization program, especially if 
the legislation requires that legalized immigrants increase 
their English-language proficiency. Educational capac-
ity will need to be increased at both the state and local 
levels. Gonzalez (2007a) provides evidence that the provi-
sion of public and free ESL (English as a second language) 
courses is either insufficient to meet demand or carried out 
at the expense of other public programs in communities 
throughout the state. Now especially, during this period of 
severe budget constraints, California should be prepared 
to lobby for its fair share of whatever federal grants might 
become available as a part of any future comprehensive 
immigration reform. ●
Technical appendices to this report  
are available on the PPIC website:  
http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/other/410LHR_appendix.pdf
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Notes
1 Passel and Cohn (2009). 
2 Data are from the New Immigrant Survey, described in Tech-
nical Appendix A, available—along with all other technical 
appendices—on the PPIC website.
3 Technical Appendix C compares the unauthorized portion of 
the NIS sample with other estimates of the unauthorized immi-
grant population.
4 See Technical Appendix B for a discussion of our methodology.
5 For the full model, see Technical Appendix Table B1.
6 Interviews were typically conducted 4 months, but in some 
cases as much as 13 months, after acquiring LPR status.
7 See Technical Appendix Table B2.
8 Results are shown in Technical Appendix Table B2.
9 See Technical Appendix Table B3.
10 See Technical Appendix Table B4 for the full results. As in the 
previous models, we control for the full complement of explana-
tory variables.
11 We use this new measure to estimate the same models as for 
occupational mobility, and we use the same explanatory factors. 
See Technical Appendix Table B6.
12 See Technical Appendix Table B7.
13 See Technical Appendix Table B8 for the full results.
14 Sample sizes within each occupation are small, and thus these 
results are not statistically significant.
15 See Technical Appendix Table B5 for our analysis of pre- and 
post-LPR occupational earnings for those working in the lowest-
skill occupations before receiving LPR status.
16 See Technical Appendix Table B10.
17 These analyses are shown in Technical Appendix Tables B1 
and B6.
18 See Technical Appendix B for a brief discussion of the poten-
tial gains from adjusting from temporary legal status to LPR 
status. 
19 This situation is similar to that of low-skill workers in general, 
who face limited job opportunities in an increasingly skill- 
intensive economy. High school dropouts earn substantially less 
than workers with at least some college education. Rouse and 
Kemple (2009) report that dropouts earn 46 percent less than 
workers with some college education (but who do not have a  
college degree)—a dramatic increase from the 12 percent earn-
ings gap observed in 1984. 
20 Important exceptions include refugees and asylees for nearly 
all programs, and for SNAP children under age 18 are covered. 
21 In contrast to the two formerly unauthorized groups, con-
tinuously legal families were more likely to either not state the 
amount of their income or report their income in foreign cur-
rency, which makes their income appear lower. This information 
appears in a separate section of the NIS that asks about sources 
of income rather than in the section that asks about employment 
and wages. In addition, although their average family size was 
smaller and they were less likely to be married than the other 
groups, the spouses of continuously legal immigrants who were 
married were less likely to work. 
22 We estimated tax-filing requirements by totaling the income 
of individuals and their spouses or partners and considered the 
presence of children. See Internal Revenue Service (2003) for 
2002 requirements. Recall that income is reported separately 
from wages in the NIS.
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